are not likely to operate in a co-operative matter. 29 Also, there is likely to be more deliberation on issues in legislatures in presidential rather than parliamentary systems, because of the greater scope for representatives to dissent from the executive in the presidential system. 30 This latter finding is supported by a recent study by Hiebert and Kelly. They study the way in which institutional innovations in the UK and New Zealandtwo Westminster-based parliamentary systems where there is no bill of rights tradition 31 -have impacted on the role played by parliament in the protection of rights. Their focus is on the effects of the introduction of weak judicial review (constrained remedial powers) and a ministerial obligation to report to parliament on the consistency of a bill with rights. They find little evidence of increased pressure on government or in the number of reasoned deliberations as a result of the aforementioned innovations. 32 This is attributed to two key considerations: the continued power imbalance between the executive and the parliament, and the dynamics of the parliamentary context which does not promote an interest 'in seeking the best way to ensure that legislation is compliant with protected rights'. 33 Causes for the underperformance of parliaments on rights issues might vary in states with different types of constitutional arrangements. 34 Yet the dominance of the executive is also part of the explanation provided by Schwarz (former Director of the IPU Human Rights Programme) for the general absence of parliamentarian engagement with the practices and outputs of the 29 Steiner et al, ibid., p. 90. 30 Steiner et al, ibid., p. 86. 31 See further S. Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism. Theory and Practice international human rights system. Schwarz points to two main types of consideration:
on the one hand, such absence is more often than not due to sometimes grave structural and economic problems and to a lack of financial resources, expertise and information; and, on the other hand, it is the lack of political will, the role of political parties, in particular, strict party discipline preventing MPs from criticizing their party colleagues in government, thus creating obedient parliamentary majorities, and more generally the lack of independence of parliaments from governments which hinder parliaments in effectively serving as guardians of human rights. 35 Taken together, the noted studies indicate that the underperformance of parliaments in the rights field can be explained by various political and institutional considerations. As many of the causal factors are heavily entrenched or circumstantial, the scope for external influence is limited. However, some explanatory themes emerge that could be more susceptible to external influence.
One central theme is that awareness, knowledge and interest in human right issues amongst parliamentarians appears too low. Another related theme is that executives are not doing enough to empower parliaments on human rights issues. 36 Both of these themes include elements that the IHRJ might be able to affect. For instance, parliamentarians could be encouraged to contribute to the state reporting procedures of UN human rights treaty bodies. Executives could be encouraged to make available to parliament sufficient information, time for debate and consultations on human rights issues, and opportunities to vote freely (or at all) on matters pertaining to human rights. 37 Targeting such 35 Schwarz, 'Inter-Parliamentary Union', p. 331. 36 Schwarz, ibid.; M. Hunt, 'Enhancing Parliaments' Role in the Protection and Realisation of Human Rights', in M. Hunt, H. J. Hooper, and P. Yowell (eds.), Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart, 2015), p. 469, 470. 37 Schwarz, ibid.; Hunt, ibid. elements would be one way to promote conditions that are conducive to improvement in the performance of parliaments on human rights. 
Incentives
The case for the IHRJ working to promote and strengthen domestic parliamentary practices in the field of human rights can appear straightforward.
There is intrinsic value in parliaments operating in ways that capitalise on their democratic qualities. It matters how political authority is exercised, not just whether it comes to the right decision. Improvements in the participation, representation and deliberation practices of parliaments can be argued for on the basis of the values of political equality, 38 human autonomy, 39 human dignity 40 and procedural justice. 41 There are also instrumental arguments in favour of the IHRJ encouraging better performance of parliaments on human rights issues. These can be about the quality of the decisions that are made on human rights issues as well as other, broader consequences. The more debates on human rights issues are representative, in the sense of the number of members participating representing different interests, the more scope there is for outcomes to be 38 Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, 219 39 Hershowitz, 'Legitimacy', 213-214. 40 Ibid. 41 reached that take account of the different interests of society. 42 The more debates are participatory, in the sense of drawing on the views of particularly interested groups through consultations, the greater the understanding of the issues at stake can be; in addition the sense of awareness and ownership of the outcomes can also be enhanced. 43 The better the deliberative quality, in terms of the information available and the tone of the debate, the more scope there is for new insights and understandings to be generated. 44 In addition, national parliaments are key parts of the domestic compliance communities that ensure that the judgments and views of the IHRJ are implemented. They do this by passing legislation that complies with the jurisprudence of the IHRJ, but also by raising issues and calling on the executive to act. 45 When parliaments become more interested in human rights issues, this can lead to stronger and more frequent pressure for the implementation of the outputs of the IHRJ. 46 
Challenges
There are, though, also a number of reasons why the IHRJ might be hesitant about developing its role as promoter of parliamentary engagement in the rights sphere.
Questions on the authority of the IHRJ might arise. No specific provisions on the promotion of parliaments' human rights role are included in any of the foundational human rights treaties. Still, the powers afforded to the IHRJ through 42 Lazarus and Simonsen, 'Judicial Review and Parliamentary Debate', 395. 43 'belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the human rights upon which they depend'. 48 Similarly, the preamble to the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) specifies the importance of democratic institutions to the functioning of the system. 49 At the global level, it is possible to find indicative references, such as the use of the term 'democratic society' in some of the limitation clauses included in the ICCPR. 50 These references to democracy support IHRJ institutions developing their practices in a way that promotes the human rights role of parliaments. Indeed, this already happens. 51 For instance, pluralism and public debate are prominent considerations in aspects of the work of the ECtHR. 52 How far might the IHRJ reasonably go in promoting the human rights role of parliaments? It is possible to foresee both normative and practical parameters. On the normative side, parliament is the institution that is most closely associated with the will of the people within a state. This gives parliaments a strong claim to be able to determine their own modes of operation. 53 In international human rights law, subsidiarity based reasoning is most often used to calibrate the exercise of responsibilities afforded to the higher level through reference to attributes that the local level is expected to possess. 55 This corresponds with the negative side of subsidiarity. 56 There is also a positive side to subsidiarity. This directs the higher level to use its powers to advance the capacity of the local level to realise the goals for which the higher level was 53 established. 57 Positive subsidiarity is associated with a justification for a strong, prescriptive interventionist stance from the higher level. 58 Positive subsidiarity can also be subtler and involve the higher level optimizing its practices to advance the capacities of the lower level. 59 The term supportive subsidiarity is a useful way to distinguish this subtler perspective from other forms of positive subsidiarity. 60 Supportive subsidiarity is most viable in relation to promotion of the human rights role of parliaments. This is underlined by the practical challenges that are likely to emerge. Practical concerns stem from the level of variation in the nature of the legislative and accountability roles of parliaments. There can be variation from state to state and within states from issue to issue. 61 Given that just one IHRJ institution can have jurisdiction over more than one hundred states, it is possible that attempts to promote the human rights role of parliaments might encourage practices that do not suit the domestic context. This indicates the importance of the IHRJ institutions avoiding a 'one size fits all' approach in promotional efforts.
Instead, they should work to accommodate the contextual demands of a particular state.
In sum, there are strong incentives for the IHRJ to do all they can to promote the human rights role of democratic parliaments, particularly to facilitate parliaments engaging more often, more deeply and more democratically on human rights issues. The incentives, though, are checked by some strong challenges. The absence of an explicit mandate suggests that there should be modesty in the active steps that are taken. The variations in political and To gain further insight on how the IHRJ might develop a role as a promoter of the human rights role of national parliaments, this section examines international policy material concerned with the operation of parliaments. This material is interesting as it originates from bodies, which although political in nature, share certain similarities with the IHRJ. In particular, they are international and must relate to a broad range of diverse states.
Firstly, attention is given to the work of international parliamentary bodies that already explicitly target the human rights role of national parliaments. Secondly, consideration is given to the relevance of the outputs of international economic bodies that seek to influence the effectiveness of legislation.
International parliamentary bodies
Initiatives to improve the functioning of parliaments can be necessary regardless of the political, social and cultural context of a state. 62 This is reflected in the work of the IPU, a collection of representatives from parliaments from around the world, often working alongside UN organs to improve parliamentary functioning across the globe. One area that has provided a thematic focus for the IPU is the protection and promotion of human rights. 63 The work of the IPU raises awareness of rights and encourages parliamentarians to scrutinise the work of the executive on this basis. The IPU's approach, channelled through its own human rights committee, has centred 'promoting the formation of The general message from the international parliamentary bodies is that it is essential for domestic parliamentarians to self-empower (to develop and utilise awareness of rights), but that it is also important for the executive to take steps to improve the human rights role of parliaments in the production of 64 legislation. 67 Most notably, the high-level resolutions of the international parliamentary bodies share an emphasis on the importance of a standing human rights committee (or analogous structures) for enhancing the rights performance of parliaments in general. 68 The IHRJ might reasonably find inspiration in these recommendations, using them as a basis to communicate similar messages or for seeking out ways to promote conditions that can facilitate their realisation.
International economic bodies
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU) are two international bodies that have produced standards to promote the quality of law making across the whole of government (not just in relation to parliaments). 69 The standards produced have been summarised as placing an emphasis on: coordination of action, broad consultation, legislation on the basis of evidence, motivation of decisions, transparency, proportionality and subsidiarity, monitoring, consistency, accessibility and intelligibility. 70 The work of the two bodies does not set out a 'one size fits all' approach to regulation.
Rather, member states are encouraged 'to define priorities on the basis of available human and institutional capacities'. 71 The role of the international body is to highlight the pool of different, generally useful approaches that are available, and to encourage the domestic body to reflect upon their relevance in a particular instance. The development of a pool of resources is something that the IHRJ could also consider working towards. It offers a means to steer parliaments towards certain types of activities, without neglecting the importance of context for what will be suitable and possible.
In contrast to the international parliamentary bodies, the guiding concern of these economic bodies has been the production of high-quality legislation that is effective at achieving its aims. 72 As such, the standards should not be assumed to serve as a blueprint for desirable parliamentary activity in the human rights field. Indeed, it is possible that the emphasis in the underlying motivation of these standards, on achieving legislation that is effective in the pursuit of its aims, could lead to a downplaying of both human rights considerations and parliamentary debate as unnecessary luxuries. 73 Such a risk heightens the need for and importance of the work of bodies with a particular focus on the human rights role of parliaments. activities. The IHRJ might seek to enlist intermediaries, such as NGOs, to draw the attention of parliamentarians to their work. 76 Still, the importance of the contact that the IHRJ has with executives should not be underestimated. The executive is the domestic branch of government that the IHRJ interacts with directly in contentious cases, reporting processes and other requests for input, such as during the production by UN treaty bodies of general comments. It is also the executive and its lack of incentive to empower parliaments that is central in explanations for the underperformance of parliaments in the rights field. 77 Accordingly, an initial focus from the IHRJ on the executive as a route to enhancement of parliamentary process could be a judicious use of resources.
The interpretation of rights
Although the interpretive practice of the IHRJ is guided by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 78 it does have a 'particular dynamism' as it 'deals directly with the relationship of the individual and the state and is thus one of the areas of law where a change in social realities and conditions can exercise a direct influence on the applicable law'. 79 To the extent that consensus amongst contracting states guides the interpretative practice of the IHRJ, 80 this might make it possible for there to be a more concentrated interpretive approach in regional bodies than global bodies on matters that connect with the nature of parliamentary process. Still, in either respect, the scope for harnessing the interpretation of rights to contribute towards promotion of parliamentary performance in rights-related issues depends on the scope and content of the However, even at the regional level, the potential for structural prescriptions for parliaments to be interpreted into human rights law remains slim. The ECtHR, for instance, has not gone so far as to specify a form that an electoral system should take; recognising that what might be deemed appropriate in one place is not necessarily suitable for another. 84 This is consistent with the view that as there remain considerable differences in the political arrangements within states, the IHRJ has to a large extent refrained from making structural specifications. 85 90 See also Karácsony and Others v. Hungary, Applications nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, Grand Chamber, 17 May 2016, para. 142, para. 151, para. 161. The Grand Chamber also stressed the particular importance of freedom of expression in the parliamentary context, but afforded the state a broader margin of appreciation in light of the importance of parliamentary autonomy. This led to a focus not on whether the restriction on expression was necessary but instead on whether it was 'accompanied by effective and adequate safeguards against abuse.' The result was a narrower violation of Article 10 (ECHR). a right. Instead, it has been interpreted as providing the structure for the ECtHR's substantive assessment of a measure. This is as follows. The ECtHR must assess whether 'the interference complained of corresponded to a pressing social need, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued, and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient'. 96 This formulation does not require the ECtHR to consider the quality of the underlying legislative process. Indeed, in the majority of cases, the ECtHR simply assumes that domestic processes are operating at a high level of quality. 97 However, this formulation does afford the ECtHR discretion with regard to which elements it will consider relevant in determining a case. 98 On occasion, the ECtHR has included attention to the quality of the parliamentary process underlying legislation. We now turn to this issue.
Modes of reasoning
In cases on the justifiability of the limitations of rights, the international human rights judiciary is required to determine how much deference should be afforded to the defendant state and how the substantive assessment (often in the form of a proportionality test) should be structured and populated with content. 99 The choices have major implications for the outcome of the case. In both respects, though, relatively little guidance is found in the founding treaties. Accordingly, the approaches of the IHRJ institutions can vary in nature and in the level of explication from institution to institution, from right to right, and from case to case. The possibility for the quality of parliamentary process to be made a factor in the reasoning for both deference and the proportionality test is demonstrated clearly by recent practice of the ECtHR.
Overview of practice
Consider the case of Animal Defenders International v. United Kingdom. 100 In this case, the Grand Chamber of the Court found that the prohibition on political advertising on television or radio (2003 Communications Act) -under which the applicant, a social advocacy group for the protection of animals, had been prevented from broadcasting a television advertisement -did not amount to a disproportionate interference with the applicant's right to freedom expression.
To reach its verdict, the ECtHR formulated a particular approach for assessment of general measures (meaning a measure the impact of which is not tailored to the facts of a particular case). This included that rather than having an emphasis on the necessity of the measure in terms of whether the aim could have been achieved in a less restrictive manner (as the applicant had argued for), the emphasis in its assessment should be primarily on assessment of the 'legislative choices underlying [the measure]'. 101 In this respect, it further specified that '[t]he quality of the parliamentary and judicial review of the necessity of the measure is of particular importance…including to the operation of the relevant margin of appreciation'. 102 The ECtHR did not provide specific criteria to determine the quality of the parliamentary process. Instead, one is left to determine what sort of parliamentary process the ECtHR had in mind through considering the way it assessed the process, and justified the view that there was an 'exceptional examination by parliamentary bodies of the cultural, political and legal aspects of the prohibition' on political advertising in the UK. 103 In this instance, key elements that can be read as supporting the positive inferences drawn from the process for the outcome of the case include the number of bodies involved (both within and outside of parliament), the breadth of issues covered, the level of detail involved, the consultation with experts and the attention given to the most relevant case law of the ECtHR.
The explanation for why the ECtHR made parliamentary process relevant in this case -and in a line of earlier ECtHR cases in which parliamentary process can be construed as having a bearing on the outcome (both positive and negative) -includes a number of considerations, such as an onus from certain states that the ECtHR should take more seriously the subsidiary nature of its role in rights protection. 104 Regardless of the motivation, through making the quality of the parliamentary process a central factor in its reasoning, the Court provides an incentive for the executives and parliamentarians in future practice to seek to replicate the type of activities that underpinned the positive inferences. 105 
Scope for development
The ECtHR might seek to develop this practice further. There is scope for clearer articulation as to the types of cases within which the quality of parliamentary process will be seen as a relevant factor, as well as with regard to the criteria that are relevant for the assessment. 106 Other IHRJ institutions might also develop this sort of practice. The latent nature of the margin of appreciation doctrine in other institutions can reduce the scope for direct signals. Still, cases have been identified from other IHRJ institutions that have been argued to reflect a similar logic. 107 Reasons to query the extent to which valuing the quality of parliamentary process should be developed further as a practice of the IHRJ include the following. 108 The link it makes between the outcome of a case and the way in which legislation has been produced generates a relatively strong normative pull. If it is used in a more detailed and frequent manner, parliaments might be more inclined to see it as an imposition on their autonomy. 109 Moreover, there is a risk that in increasing attention to the quality of the parliamentary process, there can be a slide away from assessment of the substantive outcome encompassed in the legislation. This is significant because although good process can improve the prospects that an outcome will be rights compliant, by, for instance, helping to ensure that a decision is taken with a fuller awareness of the different interests at stake, 110 it does not entail the consistency of outcomes with rights. 111 The IHRJ should thus be cautious with the manner and extent to which it incorporates consideration of the quality of parliamentary process in its modes of reasoning. A reasonable approach might adhere to the following considerations, which already seem to guide the ECtHR: give attention to parliamentary process only when there is reason to consider it particularly relevant for the case, whilst also giving most attention to the aspects of the process that have been brought into focus from the parties. 112 Proceeding in the manner just sketched links to the idea that reflective legitimacy is especially important in the international adjudication context. 113 It can, though, reduce the strength of the signals, as it can lead to a more patchwork and abstract image of parliamentary process developing, than if specific criteria were to be prescribed. Still, over time it will be possible for an image -a pool of resources, to repeat the language used in the section above -to emerge.
In relation to the ECtHR case law, it has been argued that the following image of States submit a report at regular intervals to the relevant UN treaty body on the measures that they have adopted which give effect to the rights in the relevant treaty and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights (e.g., article 40 ICCPR). 117 The procedure includes a dialogue, mostly in Geneva (on occasion, in New York), between the treaty body and state representative based on the state's report. The process culminates with the treaty body's report of concluding observations, which are consensus comments on positive and negative aspects of a state party's implementation of the foundational treaty and include recommendations for future practice. 118 To gain insight on the current condition of practice in this area, it is useful to study the recent practice of two UN treaty bodies, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) and the CEDAW Committee. These two bodies might be expected to be at the forefront in terms of enhancing the role of parliaments, due to the centrality of an interest in promoting the political participation of certain groups. 119 
Involving parliaments in reporting
The concluding observations (COs) of reporting processes offer two routes for UN treaty bodies of the IHRJ to promote the quality of parliamentary process. 120 One is to make recommendations for the executive to involve the parliament in the different stages of the reporting process (including preparation, during, and follow-up). The need for such calls is linked to the fact that parliamentarians have often been side-lined in the establishment and standard operation of the IHRJ. 121 Greater direct involvement in reporting can generate higher information levels amongst parliamentarians, which can provide a basis for parliamentary activities that are more aware and knowledgeable of the international human rights framework. 122 Concern about the limited focus on the parliaments in the interactions between the IHRJ and states has been raised in the various policy reports and recommendations on reform and strengthening of human rights regimes generally. 123 Calls for more direct engagement with parliaments have emanated from individual members of UN treaty bodies. 124 Still, it is the CEDAW Committee that has been identified as most pro-active in seeking to generate parliamentary involvement. 125 Reviewing a selection of recent COs from the CEDAW Committee (fifteen) indicates that a key action has been to introduce a standard paragraph early on in the COs. This commonly addresses parliamentary involvement in the stage that follows reporting, implementation. At times, it is used to call for the government to encourage parliamentary involvement. 126 Other times, parliaments are invited to become involved. 127 It also occurs that the importance of involving parliament in the preparation of reports is stressed. 128 The CRC Committee also calls for the involvement of parliaments in implementation and in the preparation of reports. Yet a review of fifteen reports (the most recent ones for the same states examined in the CEDAW context) indicates a more ad hoc approach, which often goes little beyond requesting that the report be disseminated to relevant branches of the state, including parliament. 129 More research is required to determine the difference that recommendations for parliamentary involvement make in practice. It is, though, not unreasonable to think that to the extent they are repeated across bodies in a consistent manner, the scope for impact is likely to be strengthened.
Calling for empowerment
COs can also be used to make direct recommendations to the executive to take measures to empower the role of parliaments in the development of legislation.
In this respect, a review of the COs reveals two routes.
One route is through recommendations that can serve to enhance the working conditions of parliaments. For instance, the CEDAW Committee has called for the UK 'to continue to take specific targeted measures to improve the representation of women, in particular black and ethnic minority women and women with disabilities, in Parliament and the judiciary'. 130 Recommendations of this nature can help to ensure that when parliamentary activities are undertaken they are of a nature -perhaps more representative than otherwise -that has the potential to help advance the realisation of rights. The discussion has brought into view the contours of an image of the human rights role of parliament. This depicts the parliament as respecting, interpreting and applying human rights through activities that make the most of the democratic -participatory, representative and deliberative qualities -that define their authority. The discussion has also identified certain causes for the underperformance by parliaments of their human rights role, some of which the IHRJ might be able to exercise some influence over. On the one hand, there are knowledge, awareness and interest issues on behalf of the parliaments. On the other hand, the executive can appear to lack motivation to empower the parliament.
The IHRJ institutions have been argued to have several normative and instrumental reasons to address the causes for underperformance of parliaments on human rights, including benefits for their own legitimacy and effectiveness. It has, though, been contended that the IHRJ should be cautious with what it seeks to promote for two main reasons: it does not have a precise mandate to promote the human rights role of parliaments; nor is there a readily available image of the details of what could usefully be promoted across contexts.
Through exploring policy materials of international political bodies and the practice of the IHRJ, it has been argued that the IHRJ is fairly well placed to seek to encourage enhancements in the human rights practice of parliaments. Yet it has also been shown that there are a number of challenges that should be kept in mind, to help to ensure that any move in this direction is to the enhancement of the protection and realisation of human rights. In particular, it has been contended that a key objective of the IHRJ should be to work towards the development of a coordinated approach, in order to maximise the scope for impact of the limited efforts that are viable for each institution. 134 This should involve coordination within institutions across the three opportunities for promotional efforts that have been studied here, as well as other modalities, such as the specification of remedies and rules of procedure on advisory opinions, which are brought into focus in other chapters of this volume. It should also include coordination across institutions. These steps can help the IHRJ to develop and project a general notion of the types and qualities of activities that are desirable with regard enhancing the role of parliaments for the realisation of rights.
To support these ends, further research might give more attention to the issues raised in this chapter as they pertain to the specific contexts covered by the various IHRJ institutions. In particular, there are questions about how far it will be possible and desirable for a common agenda on the human rights role of parliaments to be developed, given the differences in the implementation challenges encountered across the global and the three main regional systems for human rights protection. 135 Further attention should also be given to the question of whether existing outputs of the IHRJ have had an impact on parliamentary practice. The emerging body of work on the role of national parliaments in the implementation of human rights obligations indicates that, in certain states, parliamentarians do, on occasion, make direct reference to the case law of the ECtHR, 136 and the work of the UN Treaty Bodies. 137 Yet, the question of how parliaments and executives respond to signals about the nature of the role of parliaments in the human rights context remains to be studied. 135 See, e.g., R. 
